Continuity across changing connections.

OpenRoot researches how signed messages and their authority can remain verifiable as communication paths change or disappear. Its architecture separates identity, permission, custody and transport, so the path carrying information does not decide who may act on it.

IDENTITYSIGNED PROFILEROUTE AROUTE BTRANSPORT / CHANGE

WHY

The path carries the bytes. It does not decide authority.

Persistent cryptographic authority identifies the origin. Signed events and custody records describe what is being transferred. Replaceable communication links carry the bytes. Each receiving operation must still satisfy its own verification and policy requirements.

SYSTEM

Four things kept apart.

An origin signature authenticates where an event came from and that it is intact; it does not make the statement true. A waveform, a cable, a radio advertisement, a proximity reading or a model score does not create protocol authority.

01Identity and authority — who may originate or act
02Event and custody — what is moving, and what a receipt asserts
03Transport — the physical or IP link carrying the bytes
04Permission — whether an authenticated operation is allowed

RECORDED RESULTS

Recorded results.

One non-IP cable experiment: One controlled physical run over an audio-cable path carried an authenticated Message and returned a signed ACK. The accepted offline verifier passed 30 of its 30 required gates. These are verifier gates, not 30 independent physical exchanges.
One foreground phone-to-phone BLE delivery: A later closure record documents an authenticated message delivered from an iPhone 11 Pro Max to an iPhone 13 mini over BLE with both apps in the foreground; Wi-Fi and Personal Hotspot were off, Bluetooth was on, and both phones were in airplane mode and disconnected from the Mac. The receiving phone verified origin, signature and replay state: one authenticated delivery, with no fallback observed in that configuration.
Bounded relay work: Software experiments cover custody receipts and controls for replay, duplicates, expiry and loops. One recorded hybrid demonstration combined one real conductive hop with two replay hops to deliver a text capsule once.

EVIDENCE

The records behind these results.

Audio P1 Level 2

Result: One physical cable run carried an authenticated Message and returned a signed ACK; the accepted verifier passed 30 of its 30 required gates.
Scope: One controlled, non-IP audio-cable path
Experiment date · version: 2026-08-27 · Audio P1 Level 2
Method: A physical run over one controlled non-IP audio-cable path, evaluated by the accepted offline verifier against its required gates.
Source: Private technical record (reviewed for the website on 2026-10-17)
Limits: The earlier speaker-to-air-to-microphone experiment failed and remains classified as failed.
This cable experiment did not test Bluetooth; a later foreground BLE experiment has its own bounded record. Broader radio, range and disaster conditions remain separate questions.
Not an emergency communication service.
Payload confidentiality (encryption) is not claimed as implemented.

Phone Link V0 Run 002

Result: One authenticated BLE delivery reached the receiving phone with both apps in the foreground; that phone itself verified origin, signature and replay state.
Scope: One recorded configuration: foreground BLE between two iPhone models
Recorded by · version: 2026-10-06 · Phone Link V0 Run 002
Method: Sent from an iPhone 11 Pro Max to an iPhone 13 mini with BLE as the only path, in the foreground configuration listed here, and verified on the receiving phone for origin, signature and replay state.
Conditions: Both phones: airplane mode on
Wi-Fi off
Personal Hotspot off
Bluetooth on
Both phones disconnected from the Mac
Both apps in the foreground
No fallback path observed in this configuration
Source: Private technical record (reviewed for the website on 2026-10-17)
Limits: The sender's returned status notification is non-authoritative; the positive evidence is the receiving phone's own verification.
An earlier run (Run 001) carried and reassembled the message but stopped before authenticated delivery; that result stands as its own record.
No range, background operation, other mobile operating systems, multi-hop or disaster-field qualification is established.
Establishes authenticated delivery, not payload confidentiality.

OpenRoot Proof v0.2 RC1

Result: A bounded local proof confirmed identity continuity after route replacement.
Scope: A bounded local proof
Date · version: 2026-08-04 · OpenRoot Proof v0.2 RC1
Source: Private record (reviewed)
Limits: Not a production network or public service.
No global finality is claimed.

PROOF / STATUS

Where these results stop.

These results apply to their documented configurations; each item listed here requires separate qualification. The physical results described here establish authenticated delivery; they do not establish payload confidentiality. The earlier over-air acoustic experiment remains a failed result.

Background phone operation
Other mobile operating systems
Arbitrary range
Multi-hop relay beyond the recorded demonstration
Disaster-field performance
Production service readiness

Next research.

The next work concerns portable event and custody semantics, bearer switching, durable state and further bounded physical tests. Transport options are evaluated as real links with specific capabilities and limits.